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Abstract: This article, prompted by finding an ancient burial urn, using Le´vi-Strauss and Mumford
as principal guides, traces some connections between the artifactual, the ritualistic, the mythic, and
the poetic to speculate on forms of literary and constitutional order in the Irish context.
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for the past never leaves us . . .
PROLOGUE
About twenty-five years ago, working with my father in the Hill Field on
the family farm, I found a Bronze Age burial urn. Just from where can be
seen in the distance the river in the cleft of the dipping land on either side,
I pulled at one corner of a large blue stone and it shifted slightly sideways,
the covering earth tumbling away to reveal a flat irregular flagstone cov-
ering some sort of hole. I recall the heft as I slid the stone across the broken
ground and away from what now looked like a well, a roughly circular
sunken chamber less than a meter in diameter, walled with built stones, an
inverted miniature of the stone-walled field itself. From the middle of the
well swelled a large clay mound, abruptly flat-topped, colored the same
milk-chocolate brown as the earth that had fallen in around it. It dawned on
me that this was some kind of upturned old pot, that someone had taken
a great deal of care to hide; in the words of the song, ‘‘I dreamt of gold and
jewels / and for sure it was no wonder . . . .’’ I reached down and scooped
out some of the earth, and then tried to move the vessel by rocking the base
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a little. Tiny clay fragments came off in my hand and I stopped short.
Perhaps the pot itself was the valuable thing, not what might be hidden
within. Heart pounding, I rocked back on my heels and shouted across to
my father, ‘‘Come and see this!’’
. . .
Two museum people came, but only some few days later, by which time
I had gone back to University. I might have stayed had I not been deflated
by their coolness when I had called to report the find; ‘‘We’ll come and
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have a look in the next week or so.’’ I had expected a little more urgency,
a little more fuss; obviously this wasn’t high on their list of priorities, which
made me think that neither should it be on mine.
Over the course of a few days they excavated the site, removed the pot
and its contents (‘‘nothing but ashes,’’ according to my mother, who
carried them tea and sandwiches for the duration), and then filled every-
thing back in, leaving no trace. They identified it as a ‘‘cist’’ burial
chamber from the Bronze Age, containing a ‘‘vase urn,’’ perhaps about
four thousand years old, not exactly common but not that rare either—
there were about a hundred such sites across Ireland. They said that there
might well be other burial chambers on this hill, that this might be
a cemetery, but they wouldn’t excavate further. It was policy to just
leave such things for future generations to stumble across; archaeologists
of the future would be much more capable of deciphering the significant
details of such finds, so it was best to leave things untouched for as long
as possible.
Eventually they sent back a formal article on the find, including an
account of what lab analysis had revealed of the pot’s contents: two small
flint knifes (one broken); a tiny animal bone fragment that might have been
from some kind of tool; and bone fragments and ash from the cremated
remains of five humans—a man of about forty, a female adolescent of
about sixteen, and three children of about four, three, and two.1 Perhaps
a family, they surmised, overtaken by catastrophe of some kind, ‘‘such as
the destruction of their house by fire when they were sleeping,’’ and then
cremated together. In an informal note they added that it was a particularly
fine example of this type of artifact, being large and almost entirely intact,
nevertheless for want of space in the museum it would go into storage.
About twenty years later, when I had more or less forgotten about it and by
which time both my parents had died, I had an excited call from my sister,
‘‘Your pot’s in the museum.’’
The Knockroe Urn rests in a quiet corner in the ‘‘Early Peoples and Pre-
history’’ section of the recently renovated Ulster Museum in Belfast.
‘‘Knockroe’’ is the anglicized name of our townland, the ancient Irish unit
of land division, adopted by the English as administrative fragment, named
from the Irish ‘‘Cnoc Rua,’’ which translates as ‘‘The Red Hill.’’ The pot
sits amongst a few other examples of burial urns and close to various
interactive exhibits that have brief films with craftspeople demonstrating
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current understandings of how Bronze Age people would have fashioned
and fired their pots, how they would have cast bronze for axes, and how
they would have buried their dead. There is a particularly arresting
exhibit that, by some trick of lights and virtual reality, allows one to
peer through a kind of visor at a scene of ancient burial that transforms
itself before one’s eyes to a scene of modern excavation. One can only
wonder at the confidence with which the ancient scene, far into pre-
history, is represented.
The urn rests on its plinth, as it was found, mouth downward and
narrow base aloft, presenting an entirely closed clay wall to the visitor.
It has simple line scarring on the exterior, perhaps as decoration, although
the scratches seem irregular and somewhat desultory. A little portion of the
base has been restored to replace the fragments that I broke off. The base is
so narrow relative to the rim that the pot can never have been intended to
stand upright unsupported; likely it was always intended for this final end,
buried mouth downward protecting the bones and ashes within, the bones
and ashes surely just a cipher for the souls of the departed.
The information placards around offer few clues to the ineffable stuff
of how these beings might have lived, laughed, sung, and felt. Instead,
they are preoccupied with the material changes wrought by the metallur-
gists, the rock-torturers. In this context, the pot takes on a kind of
inscrutable quality of omniscience, as if it still holds within it a world
of buried meaning. It has nothing sharp or metallic to it, it was never
made to cut anything, rather it seems an egg designed to hatch in another
world that I accidentally made re-emerge after thousands of years into
this one—a bole therefore where worlds cross, a sheltering, a cache,
a reminder, an invitation, a gift that somehow seems as if it should hold
some essence of this hidden spirituality. I’ve wandered and now I live
back on the farm, and often walk on that hill in the shadow of the past, the
span of my own life, my parents’ lives, their parents lives, sprung together
in some way with the thousands of years of lives lived here, cycles of life
and death, of order and change. The presence of the dead under my feet
seems to call out for some kind of reaction, and I wait for something and
ask myself, is this raking over the past a mourning or melancholy or
nothing at all? I wait for insight, for understanding. A friend tells me I
should try to write the law of it, the law of my own tie to the ground, my
natural contract.
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I NTRODUCT ION—BEG INN ING W I TH WR I T ING
Da´ibhı´ O´ Cro´inı´n, in his chapter contribution to the recent magisterial
nine-volume New History of Ireland, notes a striking fragment of writing
from an Irish medieval scholar. The definitive authorship is lost, but it is
speculatively attributed to Cormac mac Cuillenain, the abbot of Cashel and
briefly (AD 902–908) King of Munster. In the fragment a scathing attack is
launched on the contemporary Irish attitude to history:
Imprudens Scottorum gens, rerum suarum obliuiscens, acta quasi inaudita siue
nullo modo facta uindicat, quoniam minus tribuere litteris aliquid operum
quorum praecurat, et ob hoc genelogias Scottiae gentus litteris tribuam: pri-
mam Muminensium, secundam Laginensium, tertiam nepotum Neill, quartam
Connachtorum.
The foolish Irish race, forgetful of its history, boasts of incredible or
completely fabulous deeds, since it has been careless about committing to
writing any of its achievements. Therefore I propose to write down the
genealogies of the Irish race: firstly that of the men of Munster, secondly
that of the Leinstermen, thirdly that of the Ui Neill, and fourthly that of the
men of Connacht.2
O´ Cro´inı´n cites this extract to point up the irony that the writer of the
text then goes on to produce a written account that is no less boastful and
fabulous than the oral histories that he lambasts. The text in question stands
as part of a series of written genealogies dated by modern historians to the
eighth century, and regarded as having scant basis in fact. The most
famous and grand scale of such texts is the ‘‘Lebor Gaba´la E´renn’’ (the
‘‘Book of Invasions’’), which traces a narrative of Irish history as defined
by original colonization of the island and a subsequent series of cataclysmic
invasions, each new race of conquerors entirely supplanting for good or ill
the previous inhabitants (with a remnant of the magical ‘‘Tuatha De´
Danann’’ people, at one point, retreating underground from whence to
exercise periodic interventions into the lives of the surface dwellers).3
The account picks out the protagonists of the most recent invasion and
traces their descendants down to the contemporary historical figures of
Ireland. O´ Cro´inı´n remarks that the multiple contradictions to be noted
between various different genealogies (which segue into grand synthetic
histories) clearly indicate a lack of historical accuracy, and there is plenty
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of evidence of cross-textual ‘‘borrowing’’ (the ‘‘Book of Invasions,’’ for
example, reproduces an account of the Old Testament genesis myth). He
nonetheless cautions that we should not casually dismiss such texts, but
rather read them hermeneutically; that is, guard against imposing a modern
sensibility of scientific veracity onto what were written as propagandistic
texts designed to promote the importance of various actors and themes.
The texts would have been produced under commission from clan chief-
tains. It would have been unthinkable for an annalist not to promote
a version of history that served the interests of their patron, and likewise
unthinkable to create a history that was anything less than comprehensive
in its laying out of a pattern of genealogical links from the patron back
through a glorious series of antecedents to some suitably grand and abso-
lute point of origin. O´ Cro´inı´n sees in this fascination with origins a key
pointer to the influence of the clergy, in a double sense. The missionary
monks, generally understood to have arrived in Ireland in the fourth
century, brought a developed Latin literary consciousness to Ireland, albeit
centered on biblical texts, and in the Latin script a technique of recording
that was much more designed for inflexible endurance than the native oral
traditions.4
Writing in the church-Latin world-view was a device for recording
truth in a god-centered world, and as such implied a scientific, truth-
based approach to its subject matter, origins in the sense of a bottom-
line of truth. Such truth dovetailed with a second story of originality, that
of the Christian story of genesis, which provided a model for a text that
recorded the ages of man from the beginning of time forward.5 Therefore,
although the great genealogies of the Irish annalists may be fantastical as
regards the true provenance of the early inhabitants of Ireland, they reveal
the new social value that was placed on having such ‘‘genetic’’ accounts,
ostensibly scientifically complete, so that Ireland might have a place in the
global order of the Christian world, which was also the world of the
written word.
In the same volume a later chapter on ‘‘Early Irish Law’’ by Thomas
Charles-Edwards produces a (legal) genealogy of its own, one which dis-
plays a kind of fealty to the paradigm of scientific accuracy and writing
described by O´ Cro´inı´n, and so firmly equates the ‘‘early Irish law’’ of the
title with the corresponding written record.6 The effect is the rather curious
one of implicitly equating law itself with writing, even as it notes that the
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bulk of the written legal record (the minor fragment being the Canon law
edicts) was a rendering in written form of the secular oral legal tradition.7
In other words, there is no attempt to push the account of early Irish law
back beyond the historical period and toward a search for origins, context,
or cultural significance in prehistory. The idea that a highly developed Irish
legal culture long predated the historical record is noted, yet there is no
attempt to explore this idea beyond whatever of the textual material that
was transplanted into the written archive, nor any significance given to the
transition from an oral to a textual legal culture.
In another text on ‘‘Bechbretha’’8 (The Law of Bees) which is an edited
commentary on this the oldest surviving Irish legal manuscript, Charles-
Edwards again confines himself to diligent, modest, and comprehensive
commentary on the textual archive, and indeed on one level such a gesture
of beginning with writing is simply common sense; how else might one
proceed? On another level it plays out an obvious paradox of beginning
after the beginning, of characterizing ‘‘late’’ as ‘‘early.’’
Ireland has a wealth of prehistorical artefacts demonstrating the exis-
tence of complex communities, arguably even constituting what we might
now regard as societies, in the sense of various communities recognizing
and identifying with each other on the basis of the same or equivalent social
practices and common horizons of understanding. The passage tombs of
Knowth and Newgrange were major feats of engineering, the most major
such feats in the European Stone-Age of which evidence remains, requiring
the transportation of huge volumes, hundreds of thousands of tons, of
appropriate materials over long distances (without the benefit of such
conveniences as wheeled transport) and evidently a dedication by large
numbers of people to a common construction project that would take
generations to complete.9 A polished flint mace-head of stunning beauty
was found at Knowth. Because of the peculiarity of the color, the mace-
head is now thought to have come from a site in Scotland and to have
demonstrated some symbolic power of the bearer. This find demonstrates
in spectacular form what has come to be regarded as an archaeological
truism: that prehistoric life throughout these islands was animated by long
range patterns of movement and exchange (of both object and idea).10 No
visitor to Newgrange will come away without having been made aware by
their guide that the passage tomb dates from before Stonehenge, before any
of the Egyptian pyramids, and that these sites demonstrate a kind of apex of
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civilizational accomplishment. There is absolutely no question that such
complex tasks and the evidently complex patterns of both practical and
symbolic relationship to the world, to each other, and to ideas of mortality
and transcendence (as exhibited in the ever more comprehensively decoded
ritualisms of building, burial, and inscribing practice in particular the swir-
ling carved hierioglyphs of ‘‘prehistoric art’’11) must have been accompanied
by practises recognizably ‘‘legal,’’ in the sense of implying patterns of norms
and ideas of justice. To the extent that we are willing to take on board
anthropological insight that would reject (as colonialist, imperialist, or sim-
ply mistaken) evolutionary ideas of human intelligence and imaginative
capacity,12 the patterns of prehistoric social organization and culture (includ-
ing of course legal ‘‘culture’’ and forms) must be regarded as a largely
untapped source in the investigation of our own nature and capacities.
Nevertheless, the operant paradox remains that although it is easy to
recognize the likely significance of greater understanding of the prehistoric
world, it is difficult to gain such an understanding; prehistory is after all
prehistory, and this can throw open the question of whether any attempt is
likely to be counterproductive in its tendency to error. The task of this
paper is neither to set out on a quest for immediate answers to current
problems that ancient wisdoms might suggest, nor to attempt a compre-
hensive reconstruction of the past that might throw light on basic onto-
logical, epistemological, or existential questions. Rather, this paper lingers
with the preliminary methodological question—and here we return to the
buried urn on a hillside—of how, given our access to only a very limited
store of mute artifacts, we could ever have access to the prehistoric past in
terms of its lived significance, of what it felt like.
This essay will attempt an answer to this admittedly difficult question
along two routes, the first following a line of what the archaeologist Francis
Pryor has termed ‘‘proto-history,’’ that is, the traces of the unrecorded past
that we may hypothesize must in some or other fashion reside within the
patterns and narratives of surviving written remnants of prior oral culture,
most obviously still extant in surviving myth and legend. This route—if
‘‘route’’ is not too leading a term in its sense of linear progress where the
reality is more complex—has been signposted by the anthropologist
Claude Le´vi-Strauss.
The second route, that of speculatively drawing cultural meaning out
of surviving artifacts, has been traced by certain ‘‘critical’’ historians,
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anthropologists, and archaeologists. Particular attention will be devoted to
the pioneering work of the historian of technology Lewis Mumford,
because of his conceptual distinction between weapons, tools, and utensils
that opens up a particular regard in relation to pots and containers of all
kinds. The legal connections in either case are at the level of the anthro-
pological, of patterns of regularity emergent rather than imposed.
I . MYTH , ORDER , POETRY
The written record provides an easily accessible basis on which to con-
struct a vision of the past, and there is a corollary temptation to regard the
time before the written record as not only inaccessible but necessarily of
a far simpler and less interesting order than what followed it. Much of
anthropology has been built on related conceits about ‘‘primitive peoples’’
(here ‘‘anthropology’’ is used in both a disciplinary sense and in the more
casual sense of how understandings of other peoples and times has ani-
mated much of comparative literature in history, political science, and
other disciplines and forms since the time of Herodotus forward), which
is to merely observe that anthropology is a kind of ‘‘Johnny-come-lately’’
discipline, born toward the end of the nineteenth century into the role of
further legitimating the grand narrative of European social and civiliza-
tional progress, itself a justification of empire-building as a historical mis-
sion of global improvement and fraternity rather than as mere conquest and
exploitation.13
Anthropology of a certain type has characterized the passage of culture
into written form as a major marker of civilizational development, to the
point where the examination of the past has been separated into history and
prehistory characterized by writing and prewriting.14 Here there is a double
gesture: a reduction of the time of prewriting to a kind of scarcely relevant
footnote, a long period of dormancy before things really got going, and
a reduction of oral cultures (whether from the past or not) to the status of
stunted or developmentally arrested versions of more technologically
advanced and literate cultures, in particular ‘‘the West.’’ Writing, the
capacity to easily store information over time and easily transport it over
distance, is taken as a major, perhaps the major, landmark in humankind’s
long march from the condition of being largely subject to the turning of the
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world, to becoming the agent of the world’s turning. This latter enlight-
ened condition has been axiomatically regarded as a much finer way to live.
However, the period since the Second World War has been marked in
anthropology (again in the narrow and broad senses) by a kind of sharp
left turn toward antievolutionary thought, taking a cue in particular from
the structuralism of Le´vi-Strauss (who was himself heavily influenced by
Saussurian structural linguistics, introduced to him by Roman Jakobson in
New York during the war). Le´vi-Strauss, in seeking to identify and define
deep structures of meaning that undergirded all (community level) social
behavior, which in his view emanated from the physiological structure of
the brain itself (in a recent biography he is quoted as commenting that
‘‘anthropology does not abandon the hope of one day awakening among
the natural sciences’’15), turned away from a focus on writing as a marker
of a developed higher consciousness, in favor of turning to a reading of
the myriad sophistications and subtleties of communicative patterns of
nonwriting cultures in order to stress that the capacity of a culture to
write was not a marker of higher intelligence, and to promote the idea of
the equality of cultures in the sense of their capacity to generate and
maintain symbolic or abstract meaning.16 The degree to which the gen-
eration and maintenance of symbolic ‘‘meaningfulness’’ has come to be
regarded as synonymous with ‘‘culture’’ is a mark of the influence of Le´vi-
Strauss’s ideas. To the extent that culture in this sense has come to be
regarded as the mark of ‘‘humanity,’’ and to the extent that this version of
‘‘humanity’’ has been formulated in political and legal concepts such as
‘‘human rights,’’ then his work must be regarded as fundamentally
politico-legal, also in an institutional sense, perhaps for our age even
paradigmatically so.17
Le´vi-Strauss’s particular fascination was with myth. For Le´vi-Strauss,
myth constituted a veil to what he saw as the fundamental parallel meaning
structures of different cultures. His scientific methodology drew back this
veil through deciphering the structural logic of such myths. For him,
The kind of logic in mythical thought is as rigorous as that of modern
science, and the difference lies not in the quality of the intellectual process,
but in the nature of the things to which it is applied. . . .we may be able to
show that the same logical processes operate in myth as well as in science,
and that man has always been thinking equally well; the improvement lies,
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not in an alleged progress of man’s mind, but in the discovery of new areas
to which it may apply its unchanged and unchanging powers.18
As an illustration of this theme, in Structural Anthropology, Le´vi-Strauss
develops a reading of the Oedipal myth, not to decipher it in relation to
a notion of Freudian drives but to illustrate his theory of the operant
‘‘bundles’’ of mythic elements (or ‘‘mythemes,’’ in parallel to Saussure’s
elemental linguistic particles ‘‘phonemes’’) that allow for myths to be read
both in terms of narrative, but also, and simultaneously, as a kind of musical
score where each bundle of mythemes functions as a kind of chord, where
variously notes are played sonorously and resonantly together. Myths,
then, connect the world both in that various persistent themes are repre-
sented, and in that the patterns of representation are drawn from a limited
template of possibility. This template has reference to, seen from one angle,
a vision of human nature as science in the sense of basic structures of
practical beingness, and, seen from another angle, a vision of human nature
as harmonics in the sense of the being-in-tuneness of humankind with itself
and its environment. More simply put, myth carries the characteristic (par-
ticularly significant to the external observer) that it is somehow dealing with
core and repeated issues that come up in human communities. Thus myths
provide routes and patterns of connection and comparison across cultures.
Myth also carries the characteristic (particularly significant to the internal
participant) of dealing with such issues in a way that allows for troublesome
social issues to be held in a kind of poetic suspension, resolution through
displacement of the issue onto a plane of ritualized narrative, where irres-
olution (in the sense that whatever narrative resolution that may be created
is other-worldly, not in service to operant everyday laws of nature) is
acceptable. This acts as a device to defuse potential social explosion.
The choice of the Oedipal myth as a subject of analysis is by no means
casual, since, for Le´vi-Strauss, the meaning of this myth is a metonymic
indicator of what he reads as the most basic meaning structure of all myth,
in that it develops the basic theme of autochthony (sprung from the soil)
versus twin (human) parentage, the posing of the question of whether
Oedipus was the son of the soil (the nation or political community) or
came from mother and father, a human issue. In other words the basic
meaning of the myth, the question that it poses and resolves by means of
holding a contradiction together within a narrative mold, is the question of
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the nature of belongingness to the territory as opposed to the belonging-
ness to the family. Le´vi-Strauss asks:
although the problem obviously cannot be solved, the Oedipus myth pro-
vides a kind of logical tool which relates the original problem—born from
one or born from two?—to a derivative problem: born from different or
born from same?20
In turn, this can be translated to what for Le´vi-Strauss is the problem of
human social structure, endogamy or exogamy, sameness or difference
related to the question of kinship and the cycles of birth and death. Con-
temporary politics, organized on an institutional level around the question
of sovereignty, then becomes another variant of this kinship question; the
question of sameness and difference and the obligations and entitlements
that follow.21 Contemporary law, based on ideological and institutional
commitments to property and inheritance, plays out its own operant myths
that can ground notions of four thousand years of autochthony folded into
a pot on a hillside, uncovered by a father and son at work.22 There is more
to be said on this Oedipal cultural theme, but first a comment on the
mechanisms of mythic adaptation.
As to how myth is created and transmitted, the analogous individual
cultural figure that Le´vi-Strauss analogizes to a culture’s overall capacity
to function as myth-maker is the bricoleur. The bricoleur denotes in
French a particular kind of handyman, that might most closely be ren-
dered in English as a bodger, that is, a handyman who comes up with
a solution to a given problem that might well involve the fashioning of
the tools for the job out of whatever limited range of materials happen to
be to hand. The proper handyman (the handyman as engineer) is defined
by his or her capacity to deal with a broad range of problems, but they
are nonetheless dependent on their standard multipurpose toolkit; they
are the Swiss Army knives of everyday maintenance.23 The bodger, the
bricoleur, is defined in contrast by their imaginative resource to recognize
as a tool something that could easily pass for useless: the item that today
serves for taking stones out of horses’ hooves is a spoon that yesterday
served as a gate-fastener and tomorrow might be welded to the base of
a bucket.
The bricoleur as myth-maker fashions tools and creates solutions with
them in a practical ad hoc, often temporary way, leaving need for repair
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and constant maintenance. It’s only ever a perfect job by accident, but the
job gets done, somehow or other, sometimes in stunning simplicity, some-
times in ornate Heath Robinson style. Having set out on a particular course
of fashioning tools and solutions, there is a certain amount of conditioning
of the terrain and the tools out of which the next problem will arise and
through which it will be managed or solved. The basic problems are what
remain constant. The template of issues that will concern human commu-
nities will always be limited, and the task of the anthropologist becomes the
careful deciphering of what imaginative methods, be it the creation of
taboos, rituals, and in particular myths that any given culture has come
up with, to create a framework within which its containment of the arche-
typical problems can take place. Human cultures, in this view, are no
longer interesting in their pattern of hierarchy in relation to each other,
but rather, like humans themselves, in their variety in response to the
limited condition of being human.
Relating the basic meaning structure of myth to the patterns and pos-
sibilities of mythic creation through bricolage renders up the conclusion that
when such mythic resolution of contradiction breaks down, the solution is
the creation of another version of the myth, a reworking of the pattern of
holding in check. Thus for Le´vi-Strauss the aim in relation to reading the
true meaning of myth is not to decide which version of a given myth is
more true than another but rather, taking all versions together, to allow the
variants to speak to the deep truth that holds them all together. What are
they all expressing, and why?
The above brief summary of certain ideas in meant to lead toward one of
the noted features and remaining artifacts of Irish prehistory, the Irish
myth cycles.24 Although such myth cycles are perhaps anachronistic to the
period of the Bronze Age (where this essay began), given that the Irish
myths are usually connected to the idea of a broader pattern of Celtic
mythology (of which the Irish is taken to be the most highly developed
and still surviving) and thus to the Iron rather than Bronze Age, the very
notion of distinct and radical splits between Bronze and Iron Age, just as
between preceding and succeeding peoples (the boundary being marked by
invasion and conquest), is one that has come recently under strong attack
in favor of ideas of development, gradual intertwining and cultural cross-
fertilization.25 Whether or not they may be regarded as having connections
to the Bronze Age, the Irish myth cycles certainly belong to the period of
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prehistory-as-writing. I introduce them in the Le´vi-Straussian vein to
throw up the question of a kind of diachronic poetics of the territory, that
is, to suggest that the lives and sensations of our Bronze Age ancestors
must have provided at least some part of the elements of the Irish myth
cycles which have passed down as a constructive and regulative DNA to
forms of Irish cultural expression right to this day. The idea of poets as
‘‘unacknowledged legislators’’ is based on the abstraction of law as rule into
the idea of law as order, and the recognition of poetics as a force for the
guiding and shaping of a sense of order immanent to human beingness, or
perhaps as a basic expression of exactly that immanent order that makes us
human.26
The argument suggested immediately above is played out in a variant
form by Paul Muldoon in his 1998 Clarendon Lectures, collectively pub-
lished as To Ireland, I. Beginning his ‘‘idiosyncratic wander through the
alphabet of Irish literature’’ with a discussion of the poems of Amergin—
according to the Lebor Gabhala Erinn discussed above, the first poet of
Ireland—Muldoon offers:
I’d like to suggest that the figure of Amergin is crucial to any understanding
of the role of the Irish writer as it has evolved over the centuries. In the first
place, he or she seems to have a quite disproportionate sense of his or her
own importance, a notion to which I’m doubtless offering no contradictory
evidence. The bard Amergin has a mandate, it seems . . . to speak on
national issues, to ‘‘speak for Erin’’. . . .Another aspect . . . is the urge
towards the cryptic, the encoded, the runic, the virtually unintelligible . . . 27
In support of his argument, Muldoon cites the following ‘‘alphabet
calendar’’ poem attributed to Amergin, lifting his version of the poem
from Robert Graves’s The White Goddess:
I am a stag: of seven tines
I am a flood: across a plain
I am a wind: on a deep lake
I am a tear: the Sun lets fall
I am a hawk: above the cliff
I am a thorn: beneath the nail
I am a wonder: among flowers
I am a wizard: who but I
Sets the cool aflame with smoke?
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I am a spear: that rears for blood
I am a salmon: in a pool
I am a lure: from Paradise
I am a hill: where poets walk
I am a boar: ruthless and red
I am a breaker: threatening doom
I am a tide: that drags to death
I am an infant: who but I
Peeps from the unhewn dolmen arch?
I am the womb: of every holt
I am the blaze: on every hill
I am the queen: of every hive
I am the shield: for every head
I am the grave: of every hope28
Muldoon notes with approval Graves’s ‘‘extraordinary’’ analysis of the
poem as a ‘‘pied’’ or coded form of a calendar (revealed in the rhyme
schemes and phonic references that point to times in the year) and, adding
this to his own analysis of the assumption by Amergin of the right to
‘‘speak for Erin,’’ uses this as a jumping-off point for his overall thesis
that Irish writing has through the centuries been typified by this twin and
paradoxical quality of ‘‘the public urge,’’ the speaking to and for the nation,
dressed in ‘‘the virtually unintelligible.’’ Muldoon sets out to bring some
measure of intelligibility, using as a frequent touchstone the works of Joyce
(in particular his short story ‘‘The Dead’’), who of course is the archetype
of public pronouncement in multiply coded utterance, and roaming
through the works of practically every Irish canonical writer up until the
mid-twentieth century. The pattern of Muldoon’s analysis (which he, of
course, mimics in his own style of writing) identifies grand public inter-
vention cloaked in riddles, in order to rework and resuspend the questions
of nation and belonging. This falls four-square with the analysis by Le´vi-
Strauss of myth as a form of bricolage, so long as we accept the continuity
between ancient myth and modern poetry. Muldoon reinforces his accep-
tance of this connection most economically when he calls in evidence
Patrick Kavanagh’s lyric poem ‘‘Epic’’:
I heard the Duffys shouting ‘‘Damn your soul’’
And old McCabe stripped to the waist, seen
McNamee  Bur ied Myth
189
Step the plot defying blue-cast steel—
‘‘Here is the march along these iron stones’’.
That was the year of the Munich bother. Which
Was the more important? I inclined
To lose my faith in Ballyrush and Gortin
Till Homer’s ghost came whispering to my mind.
He said: I made the Iliad from such
A local row. Gods make their own importance.29
As Muldoon comments, ‘‘the dispute is having to do with a field or
parish boundary, but the ‘iron’ in ‘these iron stones’ is a near version of
‘Erin,’ so we’re dealing with a national dispute as well. Then there’s the
international aspect of ‘That was the year of the Munich bother.’’’ The
continuity between the ancient and the modern, the local and the global,
the grain of sand and the Gods, is cemented through the continuity of
a poetry that aspires to the mythic, but also through the recognition of the
reemergence of the fragment reworked into another whole, the ‘‘erin’’ in
the ‘‘iron.’’ The walls of the new are the rubble of the old.
Returning explicitly to Le´vi-Strauss, as noted above, the principal for
him in the ‘‘figures’’ of social order were structures of kinship (most
notoriously including such dynamics as the ‘‘incest taboo’’), and this in
turn, adopting something of Muldoon’s roaming methodology, can bring
us in a kind of circle to a curious Irish myth version of the Oedipal story,
the killing by the ancient hero Cuchulainn of his own (and only) son
Connla. Cuchulainn, archetype of the Irish mythical heroes, when he had
finished his warrior training with the warrior queen Scathach, was sent out
to defeat her enemy Aife. He did so and on pain of death had her swear to
bear him a son, and to send his son to him when he was ready to become
a man. The boy was to be put under three geasa, that is, injunctions of
honor: First, that he must make way for no man. Second, that he must tell
no man his name. And third, that he must refuse no man combat.
When Connla does arrive, as a seven-year-old boy, performing magical
feats such as stunning seven birds from the air with one stone from his sling
and then releasing them, the Irish hero warriors challenge him to state his
name and his business. Connla refuses and easily defeats each hero as they
try to force him to do so. Cuchulainn, heedless of his wife’s pleas that this
must be his own son, takes up the challenge stating, ‘‘in the face of these
feats and shining triumph . . . no matter who he is I must kill him for the
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honour of Ulster,’’ and he demands that the youth yield to him. In return,
Connla demands first to know who Cuchualainn is, and the stalemate is set in
motion, each demanding that the other yield first as a condition of their
revelation of their identity. Cuchulainn is easily bested in combat by his son
but, using his last resort of a magical and unstoppable spear, vanquishes the
boy. As he lays dying, the boy asks to be introduced to the heroes of Ulster,
and laments that had he lived, he would have slaughtered the warriors of the
world for them, and they would have ruled as far as Rome itself.30
The reference to Rome indicates almost certainly at least a reworking of
the tale at some point with extra elements from the historic period, leading
certain commentators to question whether the Irish myths are, in fact, partial
reworkings of Greek and Roman tales and whether the Irish myths date from
much later than is generally accepted.31 In Le´vi-Straussian terms this argu-
ment hardly matters, since for Le´vi-Strauss there is a basic pattern of mythic
similarity between cultures in any case. For him, this pattern of mythic
reversal, father killing son rather than son killing father in the standard
Freudian Oedipal line, more usefully can be seen as a kind of ‘‘variation
on a theme,’’ in humanity’s grand harmonic conversation with itself about
the nature of human beingness. The reversal may or may not be a mirroring,
but whether or not, it is the structure of concerns about kinship, and in
particular issues of paternity linked to issues of mortality and of nationality,
that is the defining and enduring element.32 In relation to the history of
Ireland, there is a resonance and persistence of this theme: the continuous
reoccurrence of the question of killing the son, that is, sending the youth out
to die, for an idea of the honor of the nation. This idea is picked up on in, for
example, Michael Longley’s poem ‘‘Ceasefire,’’ when he writes:
Put in mind of his own father and moved to tears
Achilles took him by the hand and pushed the old king
Gently away, but Priam curled up at his feet and
Wept with him until their sadness filled the building.
Taking Hector’s corpse into his own hands Achilles
Made sure it was washed and, for the old king’s sake,
Laid out in uniform, ready for Priam to carry
Wrapped like a present home to Troy at daybreak.
When they had eaten together, it pleased them both
To stare at each other’s beauty as lovers might,
Achilles built like a god, Priam good-looking still
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And full of conversation, who earlier had sighed:
‘‘I get down on my knees and do what must be done
And kiss Achilles’ hand, the killer of my son.’’33
Likewise Seamus Heaney in his ‘‘The Cure at Troy: a version of So-
phocle’s Philoctetes’’ reworks a mythic response to the continuing political
violence in Northern Ireland (the verse play dates from 1990), a myth that
has elements of father-son, death, a magical weapon that cannot be resisted,
and comes away with a resolution where, in what has become almost
a political cliche´, ‘‘Hope and history rhyme.’’34 Heaney, like Muldoon,
finds a way to connect the found poetic fragment to the process of rework-
ing culture in a grand sense:
[I have] a view of poetry which I think is implicit in the few poems I have
written that give me any right to speak: poetry as divination, poetry as
revelation of the self to the self, as restoration of the culture to itself; poems
as elements of continuity, with the aura and authenticity of archaeological
finds, where the buried shard has an importance that is not diminished by
the importance of the buried city; poetry as a dig, a dig for finds that end up
being plants.35
The point being made here is that there is an artistic recognition that
parallels the scientific approach of Le´vi-Strauss: myth is prior to politics and
must be confronted on its own ground in terms of a reworking, through
techniques of bricolage (that is, improvising through what tools are avail-
able) to produce another version. This version can manage to hold ques-
tions of sameness and difference, belonging and unbelonging, in a different
pattern of suspension. In this device of mythic address there is an implicit
homage in Longley and Heaney to Yeats and to the tone set in the ‘‘Irish
literary revival,’’ the period spanning the end of the nineteenth and begin-
ning of the twentieth century when a conscious attempt was made by
writers under the guidance of Yeats to forge an idea of literary nationality
out of ancient myth, of confronting myth as a basic political consideration,
a consideration that at times shaded into more direct political confrontation.
The development in the work of the later poets that constitutes a critique
to the Yeatsian visions of the Celtic twilight are the deliberate incorporations
of exogamy: the reworking of Greek myth as a comment on the Irish mythic
situation, a critical adjunct that resurrects the point in oblique fashion that the
Celtic myths themselves, in revisionist readings, are regarded as already
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incorporating elements of the Roman and Greek myths. The achievement of
Muldoon is to situate all of this line of tradition within a much longer-term
culture of Irish writing, stretching back to the blurred boundary between the
oral and the textual traditions to the point where it approaches the status of
the anthropologically determinative, analogous and complementary to the
Le´vi-Straussian analysis of myth as socially constitutive.
In summation of the Le´vi-Straussian paradigm of mythic significance
and the resonance that this finds with features of more contemporary
elements of literary and political life in Ireland (and it must be kept in
mind that it is a notable feature of Irish history that the two have never
been far apart), the conclusion must be that patterns of fundamental rela-
tionship to which mythic construction provides a key are continuing fea-
tures of Irish political life, and this is recognized implicitly through the
continuing forms of encounter with myth that characterize Irish national
(literary) consciousness. Given that such forms of encounter orient them-
selves to the ‘‘Celtic’’ myth cycles, and therefore to a period of ‘‘proto-
history,’’ of written records that themselves acknowledge much more
ancient tales and stories revealing the imaginary but also certain social
realities of preliterate Celtic Irish society, the question persists to some
extent of the time before this time—true prehistory, if you will. The status
of such a category has already been brought into question above through
the acknowledgement that the more convincing contemporary analyses
would reject notions of radical historical break in favor of gradual accre-
tion, hybridisation, and amalgamation. To further press the idea we turn
backward along a different path, returning once again to the point of depar-
ture, the urn buried on the hillside. If we can sense that we are creatures of
myth, and if such mythic encounters still leak out of us as a culture through
our pattern of encountering politics (here used broadly and bearing in mind
Muldoon’s observations on the public, riddling nature of Irish literature)
with poetry (again used broadly), is there something akin to such an
approach that is possible, relying not on poetry but on pottery?36
I I . R I TUAL , ORDER , COMMUN I TY
Ritual, art, poesy, drama, music, dance, philosophy, science, myth, religion
are all as essential to man as his daily bread: man’s true life consists not
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alone in the work activities that directly sustain him, but in the symbolic
activities which give significance both to the processes of work and their
ultimate products and consummations.37
In the opening ‘‘Dawn of Man’’ sequence to Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: A
Space Odyssey, an ape, under influence or inspiration from a polished black
obelisk that has mysteriously appeared, picks up the thighbone of a dead
animal and, realization dawning, brings it up and down with ever greater
fervor and force to break the other bones that are lying around. Shots of
a falling live animal intercut with shots of the ape breaking the skeleton
skull on the ground, as if to indicate the birth of the idea of hunting.
Eventually, the bones smashed to smithereens, the ape tosses the thigh
bone high in the air, where it is momentarily frozen before the scene cuts to
another object gliding in the vastness of space; by the magic of cinema the
bone is transformed into a spacecraft (and the portentous tones of Richard
Strauss’s ‘‘Also Sprach Zarathustra’’ give way to the melodic cadences of
Johan Strauss’s Blue Danube waltz . . . ).
This justifiably famous sequence is an illustration of certain (anthropo-
logical) ideas about the nature and genesis of humankind. In particular, it is
an illustration of the idea of homo faber, or ‘‘human as tool maker.’’ That
the relationship between human and tools was a mutually constitutive one,
that the drive to create tools to gain control over nature was the prompt to
intellectual and physical development, which in effect was the mechanism
that allowed development of humanity from animals, which put human-
kind on its feet, as it were, and took it to the stars. The notion of human as
distinctly characterized by the drive and ability to create and use tools has
dissipated somewhat since its heyday in the 1950s and ’60s. This in par-
ticular results from an ever greater body of evidence demonstrating that
various animals use objects as tools, and even fashion tools, without any
seeming parallel development in mental capacity, not to mention the mar-
vellous technical competence of particular birds as they build their nests,
which hasn’t flowered into an avian world dominance. But even as the idea
was being fully formulated by anthropologists such as Kenneth Page
Oakley and philosophers such as Hannah Arendt in The Human Condition,
it was being contested by Lewis Mumford in a much more profound way
than through simple empirical comparison of humankind with other ani-
mals in the ability to use tools.
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Mumford was a historian of technology, one of the pioneers of the field.
What distinguished him in his investigations was an early and seemingly
instinctual grasp of an intellectual current that is much more fashionable
now than during the period of his major writings, roughly from 1930
through to 1970: an antievolutionary idea of human intellectual develop-
ment and in particular an opposition to a functionalist interpretation of
human behavioral development.38 Mumford’s core objection to the homo
faber thesis was that an emphasis on humankind’s functional relationship to
tools as a measure of his basic nature connected to an anthropologically
conditioned drive to ever more efficiently wrest control of the world, was
an implausibly reductive vision of the nature of humankind and, for him,
a fairly obvious reverse projection of a (capitalist) moral vision of the value
of work and an exploitative relationship to the environment backward into
prehistory. Citing anthropologists such as Malinowski, Mead, and Le´vi-
Strauss with their extensive researches on ritual, myth, and totems, Mum-
ford argued that whereas humankind made tools, this was certainly not its
basic characterizing feature, since some of the other human occupations
were much more core to the distinguishing nature of humankind; man as
a social animal lived socially, and the principal important development and
achievement of humankind was the development of symbolic communica-
tion, in particular spoken language.
Mumford (writing in 1966) argues in The Myth of the Machine:
No modern technological device surpasses in the articulation of its parts or
its functional fitness the qualities of the least important language . . .Once
language had evolved beyond a certain point it may have engrossed man as
a game, even at the expense of his putting it to more practical social uses—
though certainly primitive man’s elaborate kinship organisations would
imply a complex linguistic structure. In all likelihood, conversation became
early man’s principal amusement, apart from sexual intercourse. Primitive
peoples excel at conversation and delight in it; and among peasant popu-
lations, as in Ireland, it still ranks high as the social occupation.39
This reference to game-playing is an important indication of Mumford’s
inclination in tracing an aetiology of the development of complex forms of
communication and complex language (and, as an Irish peasant, I couldn’t
resist the Irish peasant reference). Harking back to anthropological discus-
sions of ritual, myth, totem, and the like, Mumford reverses the standard
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order of interpretation that would see such devices as yet another func-
tional manifestation of culture, related to practical ‘‘daily-bread’’ issues
(including those of social maintenance) and suggests rather, referring to
Johan Huizinga with this thesis of homo ludens, that ritual, in the shape of
repetitive social practice, preceded the ability to formulate intellectually
and speak to a reason for that practice, and issued rather from humankind’s
natural tendency to play, to perform, to experiment, to interact, to attempt
to understand, that were in turn a function of a surfeit of intellectual
potentials and capacities.40 Functionality, or rationality directed toward
functionalism, was a development that allowed humankind to self-
discipline its way out of ‘‘the dreamtime,’’ the experience of the super-
charge of the environment coupled with the super-capacity for sensation,
as a mysterious, awesome, frightening encounter.41 The early human,
before complex language, was a creature haunted by all manner of dreams
and visions, the product of a restless mind, and without the ability to bring
these under control of logic—either personal or, more importantly, com-
munal, being without the capacity to communicate and create common
patterns of understanding.
Humankind in this reverse polarity is distinguished not by its capacity
for rationalism, but by a capacity for plasticity, meaning that equally so is
humankind characterized by irrationality as rationality, by the persistent
tendency not to be satisfied with what is necessary or good in favor of what
is interesting, novel, curious. It is in this sense that the development of
language as a medium of self and environmental understanding is regarded
by Mumford as incomparably a greater technical achievement than the
development of modern industry, nuclear technologies, and such. Having
managed to order the world through language, everything else was relatively
easy. Mumford makes a related point laying out an antievolutionary argu-
ment in relation to human communicative capacity and creative ability:
If the only clue to Shakespeare’s achievement as a dramatist were his cradle,
an Elizabethan mug, his lower jaw, and a few rotted planks from the Globe
Theatre, one could not even dimly imagine the subject matter of his plays,
still less guess in one’s wildest moments what a poet he was.42
The paltry detritus of cultural accomplishment might equally be read as
a lack of concern for permanency (which, in turn, could be read as a pref-
erence for adaptability as a measure of value) as any lack of capacity for
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sophistication. Mumford is determined to establish that technological
development is simply that, not a marker of intelligence, and his sense
of danger that awareness of a lack of technological development in a par-
ticular culture leads a careless observer to a studied ignorance of what is
truly interesting. The fact that a written record provides accessibility to
certain cultural material does not and certainly should not, in Mumford’s
argument, absolutely block the path to understanding.
Persisting in his Shakespearean illustration of his point, he continues
that, were the only things to remain of Shakespeare the few items men-
tioned above, then, ‘‘Though we would still be far from justly appreciating
Shakespeare, we should nevertheless have a better notion of his work
through examining the known plays of Shaw and Yeats and reading back-
wards.’’43 This line of argument within Mumford’s work is a useful comple-
ment to the arguments laid out above by Le´vi-Strauss on the fundamental
importance of language and symbol, and developed somewhat above by
reading ancient myth in tandem with the contemporary reworkings in polit-
ically self-conscious Irish literature. It opens the door to the approach to
the prehistoric world, as a world not defined by its preoccupations of
everyday getting by, but potentially as a world much more rich in culture
than our own precisely because of the relative lack of importance accorded
to getting by and the lack of division between making a living and living
life. This may read as unduly utopian (and certainly Mumford himself
latterly in his life became pessimistic about environmental destruction and
humankind’s seeming inability to accept some kind of balance with
‘‘nature’’), but through this gesture, Mumford opens a door of possibility
in terms of basic orientation to what we might expect to find from the tiny
fragments that remain: a world of riches. In terms of trying to walk
through this door, Mumford focuses on some basic distinctions between
the kind of artifacts that remain, and to this end utilizes the distinction
between technology as functionalism and technics as a more rounded
vision of human goal-directed activity of all kinds, be that the creation
of poetry or pottery.44
In this light and, to return to the specific theme of this essay, in relation
to the buried urn and the flint knives found inside it, a distinction that
Mumford makes between ‘‘tools’’ and ‘‘utensils’’ is very illuminating.
Within the paradigm of ‘‘human as tool maker,’’ the supposition that brain
development is linked to tool development and this in turn to a functional
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consciousness, the whole being summed in the idea of ‘‘technology’’ (a kind
of ‘‘necessity is the mother of invention’’ paradigm, where necessity pre-
cedes invention and where the end is to intervene to bring the world under
control), is countered on a second front; that such a paradigm neglects the
features of early human development that were obviously directed not to
aggressive interventions to control the world, but rather to defensive
moves to guard against the predations of the world. Here, he lists the
features of home and hearth, eventually leading to villages and cities, and
more broadly, to the entire realm of objects that can be conceived of as
containers or utensils, rather than tools. He makes the point thus:
This brings me to a point that has been too little recognised by machine-
minded technologists, concentrated mainly on the dynamic components of
technology. The radical Neolithic inventions were in the realm of contain-
ers . . . the creation of moisture-proof, leak-proof, vermin-proof clay vessels
to store grain, oil, wine and beer was essential to the whole Neolithic
economy . . . 45
And so we arrive back on the hillside, the buried urn and its flint knives
within amidst the ashes of a cremated group of people (a family?). The
period is that of Irish Early Bronze Age (given the transfer of technologies
and techniques, this maps on to the Neolithic period mentioned by Mum-
ford in the extract above). The flint knife fragments are the ‘‘dynamic
elements’’ of technology that he mentions, the implements for striking into
the world, and the urn is in fact the implement that created the possibility of
the Neolithic becoming an age of farming, of settlement, in contrast to the
age of the hunter-foragers, because a farming age is also an age of storage.
Without containers there was no great leap forward in human accomplish-
ment as regards creating settled society. Mumford pushes the point further:
Many scholars who have no difficulty in recognising that tools are
mechanical counterfeits of the muscles and limbs of the male body—that the
hammer is a fist, the spear a lengthened arm, the pincers a human fingers—
seem prudishly inhibited against the notion that a woman’s body is also
capable of extrapolation. They recoil from the notion that the womb is
a protective container and the breast a pitcher of milk: for that reason they
fail to give full significance to the appearance of a large variety of containers
at precisely the moment when we know from other evidence that woman
was beginning to play a more distinctive role as food-provider and effective
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ruler than she had in the earlier foraging and hunting economies. The tool
and the utensil, like the sexes themselves, perform complementary func-
tions. One moves, manipulates, assaults; the other remains in place, to hold
and protect and preserve.46
Here the connection is being made explicit between the womb and the
tomb, the techniques of preservation, and perhaps in the world under-
standing of the time, analogous in an understanding of relationship to new
life.47 In another work Mumford, in a typical reversal of common-sense
understandings, deepens this thread of connection between burial and the
roots of civic life:
Early man’s respect for the dead, itself an expression of fascination with
powerful images of daylight fantasy and nightly dream, perhaps had an even
greater role than more practical needs in causing him to seek a fixed meeting
place and eventually a continuous settlement. Mid the uneasy wanderings of
paleolithic man, the dead were the first to have a permanent dwelling:
a cavern, a mound marked by a cairn, a collective barrow. These were the
landmarks to which the living probably returned at intervals, to commune
with or placate the ancestral spirits. Though food-gathering and hunting do
not encourage the permanent occupation of a single site, the dead at least
claim that privilege. Long ago the Jews claimed as their patrimony the land
where the graves of their forefathers were situated; and that well-attested
claim seems a primordial one. The city of the dead antedates the city of the
living. In one sense, indeed, the city of the dead is the forerunner, almost the
core, of every living city . . . in the earliest gathering about a grave or
a painted symbol, a great stone or a sacred grove, one has the beginning
of a succession of civic institutions that range from the temple to the
astronomical observatory, from the theatre to the university.48
On this reading the burial urn codes for the constitution of settled
society under the sign and mark of the feminine principles of protection,
cultivation, moulding, birth, rebirth (from seed), nurturing, and growth.
The shards of flint represent the male principle of striking and fashioning,
of wresting control, of dynamic compulsion. The fact of cremation indi-
cates, on the level of abstraction, a relationship to the dead that indicates
a belief in passage to another place, also indicated by the evident reverence
in the placing of the remains in a useful (and by no means easy to replace)
item and with accompanying tools. On a very practical level the act of
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cremation demands a lot of work since the human body requires extremely
high temperatures and therefore a lot of fuel to be rendered down to ash
and bone fragments. There was evidently a community with a shared sense
of the importance of death and the need to mark this with ritual.
The form of such community life is the ancient form of the village, the
small community in balance with the resources available from the sur-
rounding countryside, yet without the level of development into special-
ized role and task that would distinguish a town. For Mumford here lies the
roots of the grand institutions of civility: patterns of ritualism that emanate
from and provide a core of discipline to the almost unbounded plasticity
of humankind’s overactive neurology, the tendency to innovate, to dream,
to create. The extrapolation of woman’s particular role as protector, as
mother, bearer of children is the whole sequence of concerns and devices
surrounding preservation and storage, without which settlement is impos-
sible. Humankind becomes tied to the site of death because of a pattern of
belief that, to adopt an anachronistic form of terminology, constitutes the
soul: man settles where the dead settle. Soul and body come together in the
site of the village, and from the village develops the town. There is direct
continuity between womb, tomb, and town.
CONCLUS ION
This essay set out, prompted by a chance encounter on a hillside that
revealed 4,000 years of habitation of a particular piece of land, to inves-
tigate a methodological point of whether some patterns of connection could
be made back along this line of buried time (perhaps as a prelude to other
investigations of what might be gained from the connections made and the
materials yielded up by such connection).
One such line of connection was sought through the idea of the conti-
nuity of mythic tradition, and although the absolute roots of such myths as
are recognizably still operative in cultural life (and the point was made that
‘‘culture’’ in the Irish context must be taken as a conditioning factor to
politics rather than an aesthetic gloss on it) are lost, the likelihood must be
that there is a mythical connection to those people who lived through what
was likely a much more lively oral culture than our own. The idea that such
people had an impoverished mental capacity and a life-world conditioned
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around the bare functionalism of scraping an existence has been debunked
(certainly not by this essay, but in works on which this essay is parasitical).
Likely their pattern of symbolic relationship to the world, rather than
a pale shadow of our own, was every bit as lively, even if organized in
a completely different way and much more around ‘‘storying-up’’ the
relationship to nature. This relevance of myth and, whether implicitly or
explicitly, the recognition of the Le´vi-Straussian point that the perennial
problems are capable of being held in productive suspension by myth as
a basic grounding gesture of community, is recognizable and recognized in
the pattern of engaged poetic response to contemporary political issues; we
have as a culture not lost this basic insight, and it continues to animate our
cultural life.
The second line of connection sought was in relation to artifacts from
prehistory rather than protohistory. Even as this distinction was drawn, it
was called into question with regard to the self-referential and unneces-
sarily simplifying gesture of regarding history and writing as synonymous.
In the attempt to break through this wall of respectful silence, one might
propose a different conceptual division, between history as writing and
‘‘deep history,’’ that period before writing but still amenable to productive
engagement along lines, partly opened by pioneering scholars in archae-
ology, anthropology, and related studies, but still largely to be discov-
ered.49 Here the focus fell on simple items: an urn, some ashes, and some
flint knives, and from this limited store was generated, with the guidance of
Lewis Mumford, some observations about the nature of community, ritual,
and ultimately (here on a par with comment on the anthropological sig-
nificance of myth) on the nature of human beingness.
To try to draw significance from this limited (as was proposed right at
the beginning, any conclusion comes with heavy qualification as to its
provisional and partial nature) exploration as to connection, there emerges
a somewhat coherent link between myth and social practice that reaches
back beyond history as writing and into forms of village life. Such conti-
nuity certainly has implications for the consideration of justice, but to try to
draw out specific implications for law remains a daunting task. Perhaps
suffice to observe at this juncture that the paradigm of mythic response to
social issues that are perceived to partake in the order of myth (grand
constitutional and social questions that go to the heart of community and
politics) is well established to the point that it is simply assumed as normal
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in Irish culture. Adopting certain ideas of the interventionist nature of the
writing process itself, the cutting style, creates a circularity here that pre-
sents its own problems of unnecessary and troubling simplification or
closing down of possibility; the riposte to breakdown is conditioned as
the masculinist rewriting, the taking up of the pen as a kind of sword. It is
difficult to imagine what shape alternative productive reformulations might
take that would somehow avoid this route. There has been some nod
toward the pen as spade, in keeping with the archaeological flavor of this
essay, but even this perhaps, in Mumford’s terms, maintains too strong
a sense of the masculine. Perhaps it is enough at this provisional point to
suggest here that a possible alternative scheme of ideas from which such
practice might spring, the paradigm of core anthropological (reconstruc-
tive practice based) input on the nature of human beingness with regard to
the fruitful functioning of social life along lines of protection, shelter,
nurture, married to local work and connected to relevant ritual, is entirely
underdeveloped as a cultural (political) language, even as traces of it persist
as cultural (social) practice. The burial urn as womb, tomb, poem, and pot.
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